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We use administrative data from Ireland to study differences in college application behavior 
between students from disadvantaged versus advantaged high schools. Ireland provides an 
interesting laboratory for this analysis as applicants provide a preference-ordering of college 
programs (majors) and marginal applications are costless. Also, college admission depends 
almost completely on grades in the terminal high school examinations. Thus, we can compare 
the application choices of students who have equal chances of admission to college programs. 
Conditional on achievement and college opportunities, we find that students from advantaged 
high schools are more likely to apply to universities and to more selective college programs. 
They are also more likely to have preferences that cluster by program selectivity rather than 
by field of study. Our results suggest that, alongside differences in achievement, differences 
in college application behavior also cause persons from advantaged high schools to be more 
likely to enroll in selective colleges and enter more selective programs. Importantly, we find 
that enrollment gaps for equally qualified applicants are smaller than differences in 
application behavior; the relatively meritocratic centralized admissions system based on 
achievement undoes much of the effect of the differences in application behavior.
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Sandy Black, John Cullinan, Brian Jacob, Lance Lochner, Cormac O'Dea, Donal O’Neill, Olive Sweetman, and
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1. Introduction
Evidence suggests that there are large labor market returns to attending selective 
colleges and to completing high-status programs (majors).1 Therefore, college and program 
choices have important implications for earnings inequality and social mobility. It is well 
established that students from more advantaged schools are more likely to attend selective 
colleges and enroll in highly sought programs. However, less is known about the extent that 
these findings result from differences in level of preparation for college versus differences in 
college application behavior by students. 
College enrollment decisions are typically determined by a complex combination of 
student application behavior and admissions decisions by colleges, and it is usually difficult 
to distinguish the effect of student preferences across colleges and programs from that of their 
opportunities. Often, researchers have no information on student applications, so it is 
impossible to distinguish differences that arise from application behavior from those due to 
admissions decisions. In addition, in most systems, admission depends on multiple factors, 
some of which are not observed by researchers. Thus, it is difficult to compare applicants 
who have equal admission probabilities.
We use administrative data from Ireland to study differences in college application 
behavior between students from disadvantaged versus advantaged high schools. Ireland 
provides an interesting laboratory for this analysis as applicants use a single centralized 
application to provide a preference-ordering of college programs. College admission depends 
almost completely on grades in the terminal high school examinations. Thus, we can compare 
the applications of students who have equal chances of admission to college programs. We 
study differences in application behavior between students from disadvantaged schools 
(called DEIS schools in Ireland) and students from fee-paying schools, which largely educate 
1 See, for example, Hussain et al., 2009; Chevalier, 2011; Arcidiacono, 2004.
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students from high income families. Conditional on attending college, approximately 42% of 
students from disadvantaged schools attend university, compared to 74% of students from 
advantaged schools.2 Analyzing differences in application behavior across these school types 
is important for understanding these differences in enrolment behavior. Students from 
disadvantaged schools may be less ambitious in their choices than others, perhaps because 
they have less confidence in their ability to succeed in college or have less information on the 
range of college options available to them.
In Ireland, the admissions system to college is centralized and students provide a 
preference ranking of college programs.3 The college degree program offered to the 
prospective student depends both on performance (measured in “points”) in a set of exams at 
the end of high school (the Leaving Certificate exams) and on the preference ranking over 
programs provided by the applicant.4 Thus, we can compare application behavior across 
students who have equal opportunities (equal points) but are from different backgrounds. The 
Irish system is also an interesting case because the barriers to college entry are very low due 
to a single centralized application, tuition fees are the same in each institution so students do 
not choose on this basis, and disadvantaged students are less likely to be deterred due to costs 
as they can obtain a fee waiver plus a maintenance grant to cover living expenses.
There is a substantial literature examining college enrollment behavior. Evidence 
from several countries shows that individuals from more disadvantaged backgrounds are less 
likely to attend college and particularly unlikely to attend more prestigious universities 
(Crawford et al. 2016; Anders 2012; Wyness 2017; Smith et al. 2013; Campbell et al. 2019). 5 
2 The two major types of third level institutions in Ireland are institutes of technology and universities. We use 
"college" to refer to any third level institution and “university” to refer to the institutions that are specifically 
universities.
3 Programs are both subject and institution specific. For example, a person’s first preference could be science in 
University College Dublin and second preference could be engineering in Trinity College Dublin.
4 Each program has a minimum points level that is required to enter. The required points vary from year to year 
depending on the preference rankings of students and the number of available places in the program.
5 Loyalka et al. (2017) and Ye (2018a) study the centralized admissions system in China and find that rural 
students are more likely to be undermatched in terms of educational institution than their urban counterparts.
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However, few researchers have been able to study the importance of college application 
behavior. Hoxby and Avery (2013) show that, in the U.S., low socio-economic status (SES) 
students who are high achievers but do not attend high schools with a critical mass of fellow 
high achievers are much less likely to apply for selective colleges than other students. 
Likewise, Dillon and Smith (2017) find that low income students are less likely to apply to 
more prestigious institutions. However, in the U.S., college applications are complicated and 
admission decisions may depend on many factors that are unobserved by researchers (such as 
essays, recommendation letters, and extra-curriculars). Thus, it is difficult to compare 
students who have equal college opportunities. Because admission in Ireland is based 
predominantly on high school achievement as measured in points, we can account for factors 
that determine college admission, and, thus, compare students who have equal college 
opportunities.6 
Perhaps the closest paper to ours in spirit is Black et al. (2015) who examine racial 
differences in application behavior in Texas among the top 10% in each high school who are 
guaranteed admission to all public universities. They find racial differences in application to 
the most prestigious universities in Texas even when admission is guaranteed (see also Black 
et al., 2018). These differences are partly due to the heterogeneity in college preparation that 
exists among the top 10% group who are guaranteed acceptance. Our context differs in that 
admission is not guaranteed but is based predominantly on points, and students with similar 
points have both similar college opportunities and similar college preparation. We also differ 
in that we study application behavior across the achievement distribution, not just that of high 
achievers.
6 Boliver (2013) shows that, in the UK, the decision to apply to a prestigious (Russell Group) university depends 
on SES even after controlling for A-level scores. However, unlike in Ireland, UK admission decisions may 
depend on unobserved factors such as a personal statement, a school reference, grades already attained, and 
predicted A-level grades. Indeed, Boliver (2013) shows that acceptance rates into Russell Group universities are 
lower for lower SES groups, even conditional on A-level scores.
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We add to the literature in several ways. First, unlike most other papers in the 
literature, we observe preference rankings for all high school students who apply for college. 
Thus, we can study desired programs of study for all students who consider college, not just 
for the sample who actually attend. Second, the centralized and almost entirely points-based 
structure of the application system in Ireland implies that, unlike previous literature, we can 
compare the application preferences of students who have equal chances of acceptance. 
Third, we examine how application behavior differs across the achievement distribution, 
rather than focusing on high achievers. Finally, having examined how application behavior 
differs between students from advantaged and disadvantaged high schools, we then examine 
the extent to which differences in application behavior feed into differences in enrollment -- 
does the centralized points-based admissions system attenuate the effects of differences in 
application behavior?
We find that there are systematic differences in application behavior among students 
with the same college opportunities. Students from more advantaged schools are more likely 
to list a university program as first preference and more likely to list selective programs. 
These differences are present throughout the achievement distribution, not just for high 
achievers. Preferences of students from advantaged schools, particularly high-achieving 
students, are more likely to cluster by program selectivity (as measured by median entry 
points) rather than by field of study. Our results suggest that, while differences in 
achievement are very important, differences in college application behavior also lead to 
persons from more advantaged high schools being more likely to enroll in more selective 
college programs.7 Importantly, we find that enrollment gaps are smaller than differences in 
application behavior; the relatively meritocratic admissions system based on Leaving 
Certificate achievement undoes much of the difference in application behavior between 
7 The achievement channel has been emphasized by Denny (2014) and Cullinan et al. (2013) in studies using a 
survey of Irish school leavers. See also the UK evidence in Chowdry et al. (2013).
6
advantaged and disadvantaged groups. However, a large gap in program selectivity remains 
for the highest achievers.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In the next section, we describe the 
institutional background and data, and, in Section 3, we describe the empirical strategy. In 
Section 4, we present our main regression results for the relationship between school 
disadvantage and application behavior. Section 5 examines some potential reasons for 
application differences by level of school advantage and Section 6 looks at how differences in 
application behavior result in differences in enrollment. Section 7 concludes.
2. Institutional Background and Data
Our data include all individuals who sat the Leaving Certificate in the years 2015 to 
2017 and applied to a college in Ireland in the year that they sat the Leaving Certificate.8 We 
use data obtained from the Central Admissions Office (CAO) in our analysis. The CAO is an 
independent company that processes applications for undergraduate programs in colleges in 
Ireland, issues offers to applicants, and records all acceptances. The CAO centralized system 
means that applicants do not have to apply separately to each college and that data are 
processed and collected in one place. When applying, applicants can list up to 10 level 8 
programs (honors bachelor’s degrees) and 10 level 6/7 programs (ordinary bachelor’s degrees 
and higher certificates). At the end of the last year of high school, students sit the Leaving 
Certificate, typically in 7 or 8 subjects, and grades in the student’s 6 best subjects are 
combined to form their total Leaving Certificate points. For the majority of programs, 
whether or not an applicant is accepted depends solely on their performance in the Leaving 
8 We exclude people who sat the Leaving Certificate in years prior to college application as they may have done 
further education that provides an alternative (non-Leaving Certificate based) route to some college programs. 
However, our results are unchanged if we include these persons in the sample.
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Certificate.9 Applications are made by February of the year of entry and students can change 
the programs they list until July. When students apply to college, they do not know how 
many points they will have, and they do not know how many points each program will 
require. However, the required points in the previous year provide a strong indication of what 
required points will be and performance in practice “mock” exams gives a prediction of how 
well they are likely to perform in the Leaving Certificate.10 After Leaving Certificate results 
are released in August, offers are made using a “serial dictatorship” allocation mechanism – 
the algorithm allocates the applicant with the highest points his/her first preference, then the 
second-ranked applicant gets an offer for his/her top ranked program amongst those still 
available, and so on. 
Appendix Table A1 shows how points/grades are awarded.11 As seen in Appendix 
Table A1, the grading scheme changed somewhat in 2017. To take account of this, when 
controlling for student achievement, we interact the points obtained with an indicator variable 
for 2017. If the student has points equal to or above the minimum for their first-ranked 
program, they are offered that program. If not, they are offered the highest ranked program 
for which they have enough points. A student can be offered both a level 6/7 and a level 8 
program.12 
9 There are a small number of programs that base admissions on information other than Leaving Certificate 
points. For example, music programs typically require an audition, and arts/architecture programs may require a 
portfolio.
10 The “mock” exams are taken about 4 months prior to the Leaving Certificate and are a complete rehearsal for 
the Leaving Certificate. Students sit the full set of exams under the same conditions that they later face in the 
Leaving Certificate. One possible issue is that students in more advantaged schools might receive more accurate 
grades in these "mock" exams. There are two reasons why this is unlikely to be the case: Firstly, these "mock" 
exams are provided to schools by a small number of companies and so the exams taken are the same across 
large numbers of schools and, secondly, grading does not differ systematically across school types, as similar to 
the Leaving Certificate exams, scripts have strict grading criteria that must be followed.
11 English, Irish and mathematics are compulsory high school subjects and the student can then choose other 
subjects to study. All subjects are offered at a higher or lower level. In 2017, the maximum number of points 
obtained from a subject at the lower level is 56 while at the higher level it is 100. Since 2012, to induce more 
students to study higher level mathematics, an additional 25 points bonus is given in mathematics to those who 
pass the subject at higher level.
12 A student is offered one program from each list -- the highest ranked program for which they have sufficient 
points. If the student does not accept either offer, then they cannot attend any college.
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We have program preferences for all students who filled out a CAO form -- the group 
of people who at least considered going to college. This group constitutes 83% of all students 
who sit the Leaving Certificate. We believe that this group is an appropriate one to study as it 
excludes persons who have no intention of going to college but does not suffer from the 
selection bias that may arise from considering only persons who successfully obtain and 
accept a college place.13 
The CAO data we use cover the period 2015 to 2017 and include information on the 
applicant’s age, gender, high school, Leaving Certificate subjects and grades, county of 
origin, year they sat the Leaving Certificate, and whether they have a foreign qualification 
(see Delaney and Devereux (2019) for further information about these data).  We restrict the 
sample to applicants between the ages of 16 and 20. In addition, we only consider applicants 
who have taken at least six subjects in the Leaving Certificate. We also delete cases with 
missing information on school attended and a small number of cases where the student did 
not take English or mathematics for the Leaving Certificate.
The CAO data do not include any individual measure of socio-economic status (SES) 
so we focus on the level of advantage of the school attended. Schools with high 
concentrations of students from socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds have been 
designated as “DEIS” schools and these receive extra supports from the state (somewhat 
lower pupil-teacher ratios and extra state funding for other purposes) and we treat them as our 
disadvantaged group.14 On the other hand, fee-paying schools charge about €6,000-€8,000 
per annum and are generally attended by high SES students. Therefore, we consider 3 
13 A relatively small number of Irish students go abroad to study. They are probably still in our dataset as all 
students are advised by guidance counselors to apply to Irish colleges in case they do not get accepted abroad or 
change their mind. Thus, we think that our application estimates are very unlikely to be affected by missing 
students who plan to study abroad. Also, students who plan to take a gap year are encouraged to apply anyway 
in case they change their mind and, so, non-applicants are generally the least academically inclined students.
14 DEIS denotes Delivering Equality of Opportunity in Schools.
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categories of schools – disadvantaged (DEIS) schools, advantaged (fee-paying) schools, and 
other schools. 
There are no data available to researchers about the socio-economic characteristics of 
individual schools in Ireland. However, the Growing Up in Ireland (GUI) cohort survey 
provides relevant information on several SES measures across each school type. Table A2 in 
the appendix shows that there are large systematic differences in the distribution of 
equivalized household income, parental occupational class, and parental highest educational 
level across the three types of schools.15 For example, 38% of students in disadvantaged 
schools have equivalized household income of at most €10,000 compared to 3% of students 
in advantaged schools; 6% of those in disadvantaged schools have a parent working as a 
professional compared to 33% of students in advantaged schools, while 18% of students in 
disadvantaged schools have a parent with at least a bachelor’s degree compared to 58% of 
students in advantaged schools. 
Our categorization has the benefit of providing a clear demarcation by the typical SES 
of students in the school and our measure of school advantage probably largely picks up 
differences between students from different SES backgrounds. However, since our measure is 
at the school-level, our findings could also reflect peer effects due to the influence of other 
students in the school, or  role model effects based on the history of students from the school 
choosing selective college programs and succeeding in them. Teachers and guidance 
counselors also probably play an important role in influencing student choices and their input 
may differ systematically in advantaged and disadvantaged schools.16 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of Leaving Certificate points in our data across school 
types. On average, students in our sample from disadvantaged schools obtain 318 points in 
15 The Growing Up in Ireland (GUI) survey is a cohort study that started in 2006 following the lives of 9-year-
olds and 9-month-olds. We use the latest wave consisting of a representative sample of 17-year-olds in 2017.
16 An advantage of studying behavior by the level of advantage of the school is that policy interventions (such as 
information provision) are most easily implemented at the school-level.
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their Leaving Certificate exams, those from other schools score 380 points, while those from 
advantaged schools achieve 444 points.17 Given that the standard deviation of points is 117, 
these are large gaps. 


















Descriptive statistics for the sample are in Table 1. Girls constitute 51% of our sample 
compared to 50% of those who sit the Leaving Certificate, reflecting the slightly higher 
proportion of boys who decide not to apply for college. Applicants are about 17 years old on 
average, take an average of 7.3 subjects for Leaving Certificate, and list an average of 7 
honors degree programs (out of a maximum of 10) on their CAO form. About 60% of 
students attend mixed-sex high schools. Of the persons who apply to the CAO, 71% accept 
some college program and, amongst college enrollees, 58% attend a university. In Appendix 
Figure A1, we show a map of Ireland with schools and colleges marked. 
In addition to the overall means, Table 1 also shows means by the level of advantage 
of the school. Students from more advantaged schools are older on average, probably because 
17 Doris et al. (2019) show that achievement differences between fee-paying schools and DEIS schools are 
predominantly due to the selection of students into the schools rather than differences in value-added.
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they are more likely to have done a non-academic “transition” year in their 4th year of high 
school. They are also disproportionally male and more likely to be in same-sex high schools. 
We control for both age and gender in our regressions and also report estimates by gender.18 
Students from more advantaged schools are more likely to enroll in college (84% of the 
advantaged group compared to 57% of the disadvantaged group and 72% of the other group). 
This understates the differences between the schools as the proportion applying to college is 
higher for the more advantaged schools. Amongst enrollees, median points of the students in 
the accepted program are 370, 408, and 454 for the disadvantaged, other, and advantaged 
groups, respectively. So, there are large gaps in the selectiveness of the enrolled programs 
between the three groups. There are also large differences in university attendance by school 
type. Conditional on attending college, approximately 42% of students from disadvantaged 
schools attend university, compared to 59% of students from medium advantage schools and 
74% of students from advantaged schools.
A small number of applicants get into programs despite having fewer than the 
minimum points either because of disability (the DARE scheme) or socio-economic 
deprivation (the HEAR scheme). Applicants apply for these schemes through the CAO but 
decisions about entry on sub-minimum points are made by individual colleges and vary 
across programs. We do not have information on whether a student is on such a scheme, but 
we see in Table 1 that 6% of enrollees (about 4% of applicants) enter a program with sub-
minimum points. Unsurprisingly, the proportion is higher for disadvantaged schools (12%) as 
students from these schools are most likely to be eligible for the HEAR scheme.19 The HEAR 
scheme may encourage students from disadvantaged schools to apply for selective college 
programs and, thus, lead us to find smaller application gaps by level of school advantage than 
18 We have also tried adding a control for whether the school is a mixed-sex school, and this has little effect on 
the estimates.
19 Students from advantaged schools are slightly more likely to enroll in programs with sub-minimum points 
than students from other schools. We suspect these students are participating in the DARE program, and 
students from advantaged schools may be more successful at obtaining the necessary evidence of disability.
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would otherwise be the case. However, as we note later, when we exclude students who 
enroll with sub-minimum points, it has little effect on our application estimates.
 Table 1: Means of Selected Variables 
Note: 16% of the sample come from disadvantaged schools, 9% come from advantaged schools, and 75% come 
from other schools. There are fewer observations for the last row as some programs, such as music and 
architecture, base admissions on information other than Leaving Certificate points.
3. Empirical Strategy
While students can list up to 10 level 6/7 and 10 level 8 programs, in practice, the 
most important decisions are what programs to place at or near the top of the lists. Therefore, 
in the analysis, we focus on the first listed program and the programs listed as top 3 












Age at January 1st of Reference Year 17.36 17.20 17.37 17.60 125236
Year of Application 2016 2016 2016  2016 125236
Female 0.51 0.47 0.53 0.41 125236
Total Leaving Certificate Subjects 7.30 7.39 7.29 7.25 125236
Leaving Certificate Points 376 318.38 380.02 443.66 125236
Distance (km) to Nearest University 55.23 67.35 57.41 15.32 125236
Distance (km) to Nearest Non-university 28.54 30.32 30.24 10.99 125236
Mixed-Sex High School 0.59 0.84 0.56 0.39 125236
Number of Preferences Listed (Level 8 if 
list both or else level 7)
6.66 5.87 6.68 7.89 125236
List Only Level 7s 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.01 125236
List Only Level 8s 0.30 0.21 0.30 0.43 125236
List Both Level 7s and Level 8s 0.67 0.72 0.67 0.56 125236
Enroll in College 0.71 0.57 0.72 0.84 125236
Conditional on Enrollment
Enroll in a University 0.58 0.42 0.59 0.74 88749
Enroll in Portfolio/Interview Program 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.06 88749
Median Points of Enrolled Program 411 373 411 457 88749
Enroll in STEM 0.33 0.37 0.32 0.30 88749
Enroll in Business Administration and Law 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.29 88749
Enroll in Arts and Social Sciences 0.22 0.19 0.22 0.30 88749
Enroll in Education 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.02 88749
Enroll in other field 0.26 0.18 0.17 0.09 88749
Enroll with Leaving Certificate Points < 
Required Points
0.06 0.12 0.05 0.07 81229
13
preferences). Throughout the analysis, if the student listed both level 6/7 and level 8 (honors 
degree) programs, we use the characteristics of the level 8 programs, otherwise we use the 
programs on the list used by the student.
We characterize application behavior using two broad sets of variables – the type of 
institutions and programs listed as top 3 preferences, and whether the top 3 preferences 
cluster by institutions, fields, or selectivity of programs.
A. Programs listed as top choices
We use several different metrics to characterize the application behavior of students. 
First, we use whether the first ranked program is in a university – in Ireland, the universities 
are generally considered more prestigious than other colleges, most of which are institutes of 
technology.20 While going to university or not speaks to the type of program accepted, a more 
precise measure of the selectivity of the program is the median points of all persons starting 
the program.21 Therefore, second, we use the median points of entrants to the first ranked 
program as a measure of selectivity.22  
There is large variation in program selectivity in Ireland. While the number of 
colleges that students could apply to varied between 39 and 44 during the 3 years we study, in 
each year there were over 1,300 unique college programs that students could choose from. 
The points required to access programs varies greatly – some programs have no minimum 
points requirement (zero selectivity), others require very low points (over 10% of programs 
have required points less than 200), while others require very high points (over 5% of 
20 There were seven universities during this period: University College Dublin (UCD), Trinity College Dublin 
(TCD), Dublin City University (DCU), Maynooth University (MU), National University of Ireland, Galway 
(NUIG), University College Cork (UCC), and University of Limerick (UL). We also include the Royal College 
of Surgeons (RCSI) and two teacher training colleges as universities as they offer degrees that are equivalent to 
those offered by the universities.
21 The sample size is reduced by a tiny amount when we use this variable because there are some programs 
which are listed as preferences but are not ultimately offered as a program due to lack of numbers or other 
funding reasons. We cannot calculate the median Leaving Certificate points of the entrants to these programs.
22 An alternative would be to use the required points for the program. In practice, these two measures have a 
correlation of 0.94 and give very similar results.
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programs have required points greater than 500). Figure 2 below shows the wide distribution 
of median points across programs: Over 10% of programs have median points greater than 
500 while over 20% of programs have median points less than 300.23









































B. Whether preferences cluster by institutions, fields, or points levels of programs
Because we see the entire rankings of students, our data provide a rare opportunity to 
examine the coherence of top ranked programs and better understand how students make 
choices. Do they choose a field and then list programs from that field, do they choose a level 
of selectivity and then perhaps include programs from different fields, or do they tend to 
choose an institution and choose multiple programs from that college?
We explore these types of clustering by examining the characteristics of the top 3 
preferences. We examine whether the top 3 are in the same institution to see whether students 
tend to view institution as being more important than program. We also examine whether the 
top 3 programs have similar median entry points (within 50 points of each other) to see 
23 There is also large variation in required and median points across programs within institutions. For example, 
in Trinity College Dublin, required points in 2015 vary from 310 points required to enter Catholic Theological 
Studies to 585 points required for Nanoscience, Physics and Chemistry of Advanced Materials.
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whether students appear to list programs based on selectivity. Additionally, we examine 
whether the top 3 are in the same field of study to see whether students are determined to 
access a particular subject area. 
C. Main Regressions
We regress each of our dependent variables on indicator variables for the level of 
advantage of the school the student attends. The basic specification has the form
                                        (1)𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐷𝑉 + 𝛿′𝑋 + 𝑢
where y denotes the outcome being studied, ADV denotes an indicator for coming from an 
advantaged (fee-paying) school, and OTHER is an indicator for coming from a school that is 
neither advantaged nor disadvantaged. The omitted category is disadvantaged school. X is a 
vector of controls including indicators for gender, age, and year, a quartic function of 
Leaving Certificate points (interacted with an indicator variable for 2017) and indicator 
variables for whether the student satisfies several common program requirements.24 We 
report standard errors that are clustered at the school level. 
The logic of controlling for points and fulfilled program requirements is that we want 
to compare students from different groups who have similar college options. Students with 
equal points may not have equal “ability” as it may be easier for students from more 
advantaged schools to maximize their potential in the Leaving Certificate. Therefore, we are 
not necessarily comparing students of equal ability; rather students who have equal college 
options.
24 Many programs have subject and grade requirements that must be satisfied to enter the program. Even if the 
applicant has Leaving Certificate points above the cut-off for the program, they will not be admitted if they do 
not also satisfy the program requirements. We control for the following common subject- and grade-specific 
requirements for programs and colleges: passing 5 subjects; passing 1 science subject; getting at least 60% (an 
H4) in higher level mathematics; getting at least 40% (an H6) in a higher level science subject; passing 6 




We report the estimates in Table 2. Each row refers to a separate regression and the 
dependent variable is listed in the first column. We show the means of each of our dependent 
variables in Appendix Table A3.
Programs listed as top choice
In Appendix Table A3, we see that students from advantaged schools are 32 
percentage points more likely to list a university program as first choice than students from 
disadvantaged schools. When we add controls in Table 2, this gap falls to 8 percentage 
points.25 This tendency to list more selective programs as first preference is further 
demonstrated by the points of the median entrant to the highest ranked program being 26 
points higher for the advantaged schools (compared to a raw gap of 85 points in Appendix 
Table A3). The standard deviation of median points for the first preference program is 83, so 
this translates into about one-third of a standard deviation.26 While the differences between 
students from advantaged schools and those from disadvantaged schools are substantial, the 
differences between disadvantaged schools and other schools are much smaller – a 3 
percentage point difference in listing a university first, and a difference in median points for 
the first ranked program of only 3 points. These are much smaller than the raw gaps that we 
see in Appendix Table A3.
To examine whether preference over field of study can explain the findings, we create 
a variable that is equal to the median points of students by field of study (using 10 ISCED 
categories) and use it as a dependent variable. We find a small negative effect for advantaged 
25 While we include controls such as age and gender indicators in the regression, in practice, these have little 
effect. The only thing that matters much is having controls for points.
26 As an example of how 26 points translates into access to specific programs, in 2017 the entry requirement for 
nursing in Letterkenny IT was 400 points while studying nursing at Trinity College Dublin required 425 points.
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schools implying that students from advantaged schools do not choose more selective fields 
of study, ruling out the possibility that the selectivity results are due to field of study.27
We further exploit our ranking data in the following rows of Table 2 by examining the 
characteristics of the second and third ranked programs (93% report at least 3 preferences). 
First, we show that students from advantaged schools are more likely to list a second or third 
choice program.28 When we compare characteristics of the second and third ranked programs 
to those for the first ranked program, we find similar but generally slightly smaller gaps by 
level of school advantage for university and median points.
In the remaining rows of Table 2, we study further characteristics of the top 3 
programs. Consistent with our earlier findings, students from advantaged schools list top 3 
programs with higher average median points and have a higher probability that each of the 
top 3 programs is in a university. Once again, these gaps are much smaller when comparing 
students from disadvantaged schools to students from other schools. Overall, the evidence 
suggests that, conditional on their college options, students from advantaged schools are more 
likely to list university programs and more selective programs as their top choices.29
27 Consistent with this, we find that adding controls for field of study has little effect on the selectivity estimates. 
We do not report these estimates as field of study is endogenous. In Appendix Table A4, we show that students 
from advantaged schools are less likely to apply for STEM and for education and more likely to apply for arts 
and social sciences and for business administration and law. The field differences between disadvantaged and 
other schools are much smaller.
28 In addition to being more likely to list a second and third choice, students from advantaged schools list 
approximately one extra program on their CAO form, conditional on points. However, the difference in number 
of programs listed between disadvantaged and other schools is small and statistically insignificant.
29 As mentioned earlier, a small number of disadvantaged students can access programs with below minimum 
points at the discretion of individual colleges through the HEAR program. To examine how this might affect our 
estimates, we have re-estimated Table 2 after first excluding any person who enrolled in a program with lower 
than minimum points. This exercise produces similar but slightly larger gaps by level of advantage.
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University 0.029** 0.077** 0.272 125,236
(0.009) (0.012)
Median Points 3.179* 26.440** 0.466 124,749
(1.481) (2.208)
Median Points of students in field -0.268 -2.591** 0.136 125,236
(0.385) (0.646)
Second Preference
List a 2nd preference 0.013** 0.025** 0.058 125,236
(0.004) (0.004)
University 0.028** 0.077** 0.257 119,088
(0.008) (0.012)
Median Points 0.633 24.565** 0.425 118,349
(24.56) (2.124)
Third Preference
List a 3rd preference 0.029** 0.061** 0.096 125,236
(0.008) (0.008)
University 0.018* 0.065** 0.223 111,716
(0.008) (0.013)
Median Points -0.242 20.832** 0.387 110,855
(1.169) (1.900)
Top 3 Preferences
All university 0.029** 0.096** 0.290 115,908
(0.007) (0.014)
Average Median Points 1.512 24.604** 0.527 113,923
(1.332) (2.073)
All same college -0.002 0.014 0.009 115,908
(0.012) (0.022)
All same university 0.007 0.039 0.041 115,908
(0.008) (0.021)
All same non-university -0.009 -0.024** 0.087 115,908
(0.008) (0.008)
All same field -0.009 -0.054** 0.016 115,908
(0.007) (0.012)
All similar points 0.021** 0.072** 0.015 113,923
(0.006) (0.011)
All similar points but not all same field 0.011* 0.073** 0.004 113,923
(0.004) (0.009)
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses. ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. The omitted category is disadvantaged 
school. Controls include indicators for gender, age, and year, a quartic function of Leaving Certificate points (interacted with 
an indicator variable for 2017), and indicator variables for whether the student satisfies several subject- and grade-specific 
requirements for common programs and colleges.
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Whether choices cluster by institutions, fields, or points levels of programs
Students may have preferences for particular institutions, and we look at whether their 
top 3 preferences are all in the same college. Interestingly, we find that, conditional on 
Leaving Certificate points, there is no significant difference across groups in the probability 
of listing all 3 from the same college. We explore this further by studying whether all 3 top 
preferences are in the same university or in the same non-university. We find that students 
from advantaged schools are more likely to list their top 3 programs from the same university 
but less likely to list their top 3 all from the same non-university.
In a subsequent row, we find that, conditional on points, students from advantaged 
schools are about 5 percentage points less likely to list all 3 from the same field. Here we 
define field using 10 ISCED categories – despite the large number of categories, 44% of the 
sample have their first 3 preferences from the same field.30 Students from advantaged schools 
are also 7 percentage points more likely to have the median points of all 3 top preferences be 
within 50 points of each other. A plausible explanation is that students from advantaged 
schools are attracted to selective programs even if they vary by field. In the next row, we 
explore the clustering of the top 3 preferences further and find that the advantaged group is 
more likely to have all 3 preferences within 50 points of each other but in different fields.31 
Once again, the differences between disadvantaged schools and other schools are much 
smaller than those between advantaged and other schools.
Heterogeneous Effects by Leaving Certificate Achievement of Students
In Figure 3, we show how the effects differ across the points distribution for selected 
outcomes. We split the sample by decile of the applicant points distribution and run separate 
30 The 10 ISCED fields include the following: Education; Arts and humanities; Social sciences, journalism and 
information; Business, administration and law; Natural sciences, Mathematics and Statistics; Information and 
communications technologies; Engineering, manufacturing and construction; Agriculture, forestry, fisheries and 
veterinary; Health and welfare; Services.
31 We define the fields to be different if at least one of the 3 fields differs from another field. Likewise, we 
define the points levels to be different if the absolute value of the distance between the points for any two 
preferences is greater than 50.
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regressions for each decile. Figure 3 shows the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for 
each decile. 
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Note: Disadvantaged schools represent the reference category. Figures conditional on age, year, gender, Leaving Certificate 
points and program requirements. Deciles based on the applicant points distribution. Separate regressions are run for each 
decile.
Figure 3 shows that differences between students from advantaged and disadvantaged 
schools are present throughout the points distribution and not just for high or low achievers. 
The differences in probability of listing a university as first choice become smaller with 
higher points as the probability converges towards 1 for both groups. However, the gaps in 
median points between students from advantaged and disadvantaged schools get larger as 
points increase and this gap in median points is about 30 points for each of the top 6 deciles. 
As we saw in Table 2, differences between students from disadvantaged and other schools are 
smaller – the estimates are basically zero for the bottom 3 deciles and then increase to about 
21
10 points in the top deciles. While the literature (Hoxby and Avery, 2013; Black et al., 2015) 
has emphasized SES gaps in application choices of high achieving students, there are large 
gaps throughout the achievement distribution and, especially throughout the top half of the 
distribution.
In Figure 3, we also show how clustering of the top 3 choices varies across the points 
distribution. Irrespective of decile, there are no significant differences across school types in 
the probability that the top 3 choices are for the same college. When we study whether all 3 
top choices are in the same field, the main gap is in the top 3 achievement deciles. In these 
deciles, students from advantaged schools are about 7 percentage points less likely to list all 3 
top choices in the same field. Another striking finding from these pictures is that the tendency 
of students from advantaged schools to cluster choices by points level rather than by field is 
only apparent for the top 4 achievement deciles. For the top two deciles, the effect is very 
large at about 15 percentage points. As before, disadvantaged schools and other schools look 
reasonably similar in terms of these outcomes.
Heterogeneous Effects by Gender
In Appendix Table A5, we examine differences in the effects by gender for selected 
outcomes. The gap in median points between advantaged and disadvantaged schools is 
slightly higher for boys than girls (29 versus 22) and this difference is statistically significant. 
However, gender differences in the coefficients for the other outcomes are smaller and not 
statistically significant. We conclude that the broad patterns of application behavior are 
similar for boys and girls.
5. Why do Choices differ by School Advantage?
There are many possible reasons why students from advantaged schools may be more 
likely to list selective college programs, such as different interests, greater ambition, and 
22
more information about options. We cannot distinguish between these possibilities, but here 
we explore two possible reasons for our finding. The first is that more advantaged students 
are more likely to list their most preferred college program even if they have no chance of 
being admitted to it. The second is that they are geographically closer to selective institutions.
Zero-probability choices
As shown by Svensson (1999), the allocation mechanism used for college applications 
would be strategy-proof and induce applicants to provide a ranking that reflects their 
preferences if additional choices were costless (which they are) and there were no limits on 
how many programs students could rank (there is a limit of 10 choices per list). Because 
students can only rank a finite number of programs, it may be optimal for them to include 
programs towards the end of the preference list that are less preferred than some omitted 
programs but for which there is a very high probability of admittance for the student. Indeed, 
it is even reasonable for students to not list their most-preferred program as first choice if 
they believe that they have zero probability of obtaining this program. In this section, we 
consider whether students differ in whether they list “zero-probability” programs as first 
choice.
 We define zero-probability programs as ones where the required points in the 
previous year were over 100 points greater than the points achieved by the student.32 23% of 
applications have first choices that satisfy our definition of “zero probability” so clearly many 
students list their most-preferred option first, even if they are very unlikely to obtain it. 
Controlling for points, students from more advantaged schools are a statistically significant 8 
percentage points more likely to list a zero-probability program as first choice. The difference 
between students from disadvantaged and other schools is small and statistically insignificant.
32 We find similar effects if we define zero-probability programs to be programs with required points in the 
previous year that are 75, 100, 125 or 150 points greater than the points achieved by the student.
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So, can a tendency of students from advantaged schools to list zero-probability 
programs explain our earlier findings for median points? To examine this, we eliminate all 
zero-probability choices and study the characteristics of the first listed choice that is not zero-
probability.33 The estimates are in the second panel of Table 3 – the first panel has the 
baseline estimates from Table 2. The estimates are quite similar to baseline, suggesting that 
the gaps we found earlier are not simply due to advantaged students listing programs that 
they have no hope of obtaining.34
Distance as a Mediator
Because disadvantaged schools are likely to be geographically more isolated from 
colleges, universities in particular, distance may be a mediating variable through which 
disadvantage correlates with college application behavior.35 This is evident in Appendix 
Figure A1 which shows that advantaged schools are predominantly located in Dublin, home 
to many colleges and universities. We examine this issue by adding control variables for 
distance (as a quadratic) from the high school to the closest university and to the closest non-
university.36 We also add indicators for the county of residence of the applicant (there are 26 
counties in the Republic of Ireland) to further control for locational factors. 
The estimates are in the third panel of Table 3. We find that the distance controls 
affect our estimates for whether students list a university as first preference (the effect of 
coming from an advantaged school changes from 8 percentage points in Table 2 to 5 
33 The sample size is smaller here than earlier as we lose observations where we do not know the required points 
in the previous year because the program is new or because it is a portfolio/interview program.
34 This finding is consistent with our earlier finding that the gaps for first preferences are also present for second 
and third preferences. Our results are not being driven by some students making one extremely unrealistic 
choice.
35 On average, disadvantaged schools are 29km from the nearest non-university and 67km from the nearest 
university. The equivalent distances for the advantaged schools are 10km and 15km. Cullinan and Duggan 
(2016) and Flannery and Cullinan (2014) show that distance affects student college choices in Ireland.
36 We calculate distance from each school to each college using the georoutei command in Stata (Weber and 
Peclat, 2017), which calculates the travel distance between two points defined by their geographical coordinates. 
Travel distance is defined as the number of kilometers necessary to drive by car in order to get from one point to 
another, in our case, from a particular school to a particular college both defined using geographical coordinates. 
This way of calculating distance is superior to using straight line distances given we are interested in how long it 
would take a student to get to a college from their locality.
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percentage points). Also, the coefficient for median points of the top-ranked program falls 
from 26 to 17; however, the associations remain large and statistically significant. We 
conclude that advantaged schools are more likely to be close to a university and this accounts 
in part for the preference of their students for universities and for more selective programs. In 
contrast, the (small) gaps between disadvantaged and other schools are unchanged, reflecting 
the similarity in their distances from colleges and universities.37
Table 3: Characteristics of College Programs Listed as First Preference





University 0.029** 0.077** 0.272 125,236
(0.009) (0.012)




University 0.041** 0.078** 0.390 99,634
(0.008) (0.013)




University 0.030** 0.046** 0.284 125,236
(0.007) (0.011)
Median Points 3.246** 17.322** 0.477 124,749
(1.004) (1.781)
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses. ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. The omitted category is disadvantaged 
school. Controls include indicators for gender, age, and year, a quartic function of Leaving Certificate points (interacted with 
an indicator variable for 2017), indicator variables for whether the student satisfies several subject- and grade-specific 
requirements for common programs and colleges, a quadratic function of distance to the nearest university and to the nearest 
non-university, and indicators for county of residence of the applicant.
37 When we look across the achievement distribution, we find no evidence that controlling for distance reduces 
gaps disproportionally at high or low achievement levels.
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6. Do different application patterns lead to different enrollment outcomes?
We have seen that there are systematic differences in application behavior across 
students in advantaged and disadvantaged schools. Conceptually, these may or may not lead 
to different outcomes across these groups for people with the same college options. For 
example, if all students aim very high with their first preference, differences in their exact 
level of ambition may not matter as the actual program they receive will be determined by 
their Leaving Certificate points.38 Therefore, in this section, we use regression analysis to 
examine differences in college entry by level of school advantage, conditional on Leaving 
Certificate achievement.
Who goes to College?
First, we examine whether students enter any college program (71% of applicants do). 
In Figure 4, we show the estimates by achievement decile, controlling for Leaving Certificate 
points and program requirements. We find that, in contrast to the 26 percentage point raw 
enrolment gap between the advantaged and disadvantaged groups (shown in Table 1), there is 
no evidence of any gap in the top half of the achievement distribution; the gap in the bottom 
half is about 5 percentage points and statistically significant (if we pool all students, we get a 
statistically insignificant effect of 2 percentage points).39 So, while there is little average 
difference in college attendance rates conditional on points, low-achieving students are more 
likely to go to college if coming from advantaged schools.40
38 Differences in the probability of accepting offers could also affect enrollment outcomes. However, we find 
that there is little systematic difference between groups in the tendency to accept programs conditional on 
having an offer -- the estimates are generally very small and statistically insignificant.
39 These large falls are consistent with the findings of Denny (2014) and Cullinan et al. (2013) from a survey of 
Irish school leavers.
40 We cannot observe enrollment of the relatively small number of students who move abroad to study. It is 
likely that students from advantaged schools are more likely to enroll abroad so the enrollment gap between 
students from advantaged and disadvantaged schools would be slightly higher if foreign enrollment were 
observed.
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Note: Disadvantaged schools represent the reference category. Figures conditional on age, year, gender, Leaving Certificate 
points and program requirements. Deciles based on the applicant points distribution. Separate regressions are run for each 
decile.
Also, in Figure 4, we see that, conditional on points, students from advantaged 
schools are much less likely to enroll in their top ranked program (defined as their top level 8 
if they list both level 6/7s and level 8s) than are students from disadvantaged schools. This is 
consistent with our earlier findings that they tend to list more selective programs as top 
choices, conditional on points. Interestingly, this follows a u-shaped pattern, with the gap 
being largest (over 30 percentage points) at about the 80th percentile of achievement. This 
reflects the fact that students with low points are unlikely to obtain their first choice, 
irrespective of their level of ambition; students with very high points are likely to obtain their 
top choice even if very ambitious. So, the gaps across school advantage in whether students 




For comparison to the literature, we create a measure of “match quality” like that used 
by Campbell et al. (2019), Dillon and Smith (2017), and others. This is a continuous variable 
that represents the distance of each student’s enrolled program from their ideally matched 
program (where a match is defined as ideal if the rank of the program in the program quality 
distribution, as measured by median Leaving Certificate points of program entrants, exactly 
matches the rank of the student in the overall Leaving Certificate points distribution). 
We create the measure in three steps: First, we identify the percentile rank of each 
student in the distribution of Leaving Certificate points of enrolled students in that year. The 
rank is normalized to be between 0 and 1, where 1 is the highest and 0 is the lowest points. 
Second, we identify the percentile rank of each program in the (student-weighted) 
distribution of program quality, based on the median Leaving Certificate points of students 
who ultimately enroll in the program in that year. This rank is also normalized to be between 
0 and 1, where 1 is the highest and 0 is the lowest median points. Third, we subtract the 
percentile rank of the student in the program quality distribution from the program’s 
percentile rank in the exam results distribution.
The result is a continuous variable that represents the distance in rank of the program 
enrolled in by each student from their ideally matched program (that which would be 
attended by others in the same position of the ability distribution). If the student is at the 
median in terms of Leaving Certificate points of enrollees, match quality is zero if they enroll 
in a program that is at the median of the program quality distribution. If the student is at the 
40th percentile of the enrollee Leaving Certificate points distribution, and they enroll in a 
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program that is at the median of the program quality distribution, then their match quality is 
0.1 percentile ranks.41 
The Effect of the Centralized Admissions System
We now restrict the sample to enrollees and study whether they attend a university, 
and the selectivity of the program they enroll in. Figure 5 provides a graphical illustration of 
the extent to which the centralized system undoes the gap in application behavior, conditional 
on Leaving Certificate points. In each panel, the first bar shows the gaps in first preferences 
of applicants and the second bar shows the equivalent gaps for enrolled students. For 
university, the gap (between advantaged and disadvantaged schools) in first preferences of 
applicants is 8 percentage points while the gap in enrollment is 4 percentage points, 
considerable given that we are comparing students who have the same college options but 
much lower than the 32 percentage point raw gap (Table 1). For median program points, the 
analogous gaps are 26 and 10 points for first preferences and enrolment, respectively. This 
10-point enrolment gap is about 12% of a standard deviation and is considerable smaller than 
the 84-point raw gap in Table 1. Relatedly, we find that, conditional on points, students from 
advantaged schools have 3 percentiles (about 20% of a standard deviation) higher match 
quality with their entry program (the gap in match quality based on their first preferences is 
0.08 percentile ranks).42 Another notable finding in Figure 5 is the lack of any difference in 
median program points or match quality between students from disadvantaged schools and 
from other schools. 
41 By construction, the mean of match quality is zero. If like Campbell et al. (2019) and Dillon and Smith 
(2017), we define match quality greater than 0.2 as overmatch and match quality less than -0.2 as undermatch, 
we find that 6% of enrollees are overmatched and 8% are undermatched. These compare to about 16% of each 
type in the UK study of Campbell et al. (2019), and about 25% of each type in the U.S. study of Dillon and 
Smith (2017). The differences may reflect differences in the admissions systems across countries. It is also 
likely that the direct link between our measure of achievement and admission decisions leads to lower 
deviations in measured match quality in the Irish data. Figure A2 in the appendix shows the distribution of 
match quality by school type.
42 If we add controls for distance, the match quality effects get smaller, falling to 2 percentiles, with the median 
points effect falling to 7 points.
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Figure 5: How the Centralized Admissions System Reduces School Advantage Gaps 
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Disadvantaged schools represent the reference category. Figures conditional on age, year, gender, Leaving 
Certificate points and program requirements.
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We conclude that the points system used to allocate college places reduces but does 
not eliminate the differences that exist in application behavior between students from 
advantaged and disadvantaged schools. Our findings also suggest that data on enrolled 
students, in the absence of applications data, may not provide an accurate indication of 
differences in application behavior by level of advantage.
Conceptually, the “undoing” effect may partly arise because of the HEAR program 
that enables some disadvantaged students to enter college programs with lower points than 
the minimum required for other students. As Table 1 shows, 4% of applicants (6% of 
enrollees) enter a program despite having points below what is officially required. The third 
bar in Figure 5 assesses the importance of this factor by omitting all observations where we 
observe students accepting a program despite having less than the required points. Omitting 
these students increases the university enrollment gap substantially, increasing the gap 
between disadvantaged schools and all other schools by about 2 percentage points. However, 
for median points and match quality, we find that the enrollment gaps are now only slightly 
larger – the favorable treatment of disadvantaged students in admissions plays little role in 
reducing enrollment gaps in selectivity. These findings suggest that the HEAR program has 
been successful in increasing university enrollment of students from disadvantaged schools 
but has had less impact on the selectivity of the programs that they attend.
Effect of the Admissions System by Achievement
In Figure 6, we split the sample of enrollees into quartiles based on their points to 
examine whether the admissions system has differing effects for students with different levels 
of achievement.43 In the left panels of the figure, we show the gaps in first preferences by 
school advantage as estimated separately for each quartile of the Leaving Certificate points 
distribution of enrollees. Then, in the right panel, we show the equivalent gaps in enrollment 
43 In Appendix Table A6, we show how enrollment effects differ by gender. We find somewhat larger school 
advantage gaps in selectivity for boys and the differences are at the margin of statistical significance.
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outcomes by achievement quartile. Thus, a comparison of the left and right panels shows how 
the first preferences differ from actual outcomes for each quartile of the enrollee points 
distribution.
For university, with the clear exception of the 3rd quartile of achievement, there is not 
much difference in the school advantage gaps between first preferences and enrollment. The 
lack of an enrollment gap in the 3rd quartile may arise because, at these achievement levels, 
students from advantaged schools are very likely to list a university as first choice but may 
not obtain sufficient points to enroll. The findings for program selectivity (as measured by 
median points or match quality) are quite different. Here we see large enrollment effects only 
for the top quartile of achievement – while advantaged students throughout the points 
distribution are more likely to list highly selective programs as first choice, only the high 
achievers end up with a large school advantage gap in selectivity.44 Greater ambition in 
application translates into program selectivity differences primarily for persons who have 
high points and can access the most selective programs.
44 The most comparable findings to ours are those of Campbell et al. (2019) from the UK who find differences 
in match quality between the highest and lowest SES groups of 2.5 percentiles for the lowest achievement 
quintile and 8.3 percentiles for the highest achievement quintile. These are reasonably similar to our findings of 
3 percentiles for the lowest achievement quartile and 6 percentiles for the highest achievement quartile. 
32










Other Schools Advantaged Schools











Other Schools Advantaged Schools












Other Schools Advantaged Schools
Quartiles of the Achievement Distribution











Other Schools Advantaged Schools














Other Schools Advantaged Schools
Quartiles of the Achievement Distribution












Other Schools Advantaged Schools
Quartiles of the Achievement Distribution
Match Quality Enrollment
Note: Disadvantaged schools represent the reference category. Figures conditional on age, year, gender, Leaving Certificate 
points and program requirements. Quartiles based on Leaving Certificate points of sample who enroll in college. Separate 
regressions run for each achievement quartile.
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7. Conclusions
In this paper, we have compared the application behavior of students who have the 
same college opportunities but who are in high schools with different levels of advantage. 
Our main finding is that, even controlling for college opportunities, students from advantaged 
schools are more likely to list selective programs as their first ranked preference and top three 
preferences and are more likely to list university programs. They are also less likely to enroll 
in their first ranked college program and more likely to enter programs that they ranked 
lower, demonstrating the greater selectivity of their first preference program. We also find 
that students from advantaged schools are more likely to list programs with similar median 
entry points (similar levels of selectivity), regardless of the field of study. In contrast, 
students from disadvantaged schools are more likely to list multiple programs in the same 
field of study.
We find that application differences are present throughout the achievement 
distribution and are visible for both low- and high-achievers. However, students from 
disadvantaged schools behave quite similarly to students from other schools – most of the 
differences we find relate to students from advantaged schools behaving differently to other 
students.
It is difficult to determine the underlying mechanisms that lead students in advantaged 
schools to list more selective programs, conditional on achievement. We show that it does not 
arise from the greater tendency of advantaged students to list programs for which they have 
no chance of admission. It is also unrelated to differences in field of study preferences. One 
partial explanation is geographic location; advantaged schools are more likely to be located 
close to universities. Taking account of this factor reduces the size of the effects of school 
advantage on college choice rankings but they remain large. We can conclude that, while 
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geography matters, it is not just geography that determines gaps in college choice behavior 
between students in advantaged and disadvantaged schools.
There are many possible reasons for our findings. They could reflect that students 
from advantaged schools are more ambitious, perhaps because they are encouraged by 
parents, teachers, or peers to aim high. More advantaged students may also have more 
confidence in their ability to fit in and succeed in selective college programs or in the careers 
to which they later lead. Another possibility is information differences – students in more 
advantaged schools may be aware of a wider range of selective college programs. Whatever 
the reason, even conditional on college opportunities, students from more advantaged schools 
are more likely to list selective college programs when applying for college.
The gaps we find in enrollment are smaller than those for applications as, 
fundamentally, programs are allocated based on points. Once one takes account of points and 
whether students satisfy program requirements, there is only evidence of a gap between 
students from advantaged and disadvantaged schools in college entry for the bottom half of 
the achievement distribution; there is no evidence of a college entry gap for students with 
above-median achievement. However, conditional on entering college, students from 
advantaged schools are likely to enter more selective programs and are less likely to be 
undermatched with their program. These differences are largest for high achievers.
Overall, we conclude that despite the relative simplicity and transparency of the 
centralized application process, there are meaningful differences in application behavior 
across students who have similar college opportunities but come from schools with different 
levels of advantage. The centralized admissions system undoes some, but not all, of these 
effects, so differences in application behavior translate into substantial differences in 
enrollment patterns. These enrollment differences have implications for intergenerational 
inequality in educational outcomes and for subsequent labor market earnings. The findings 
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also suggest that, while lower entry standards for disadvantaged students can lead to greater 
access to more selective programs, there is also a potential role for policy interventions (such 
as information provision (Oreopoulos and Dunn, 2013; Hoxby and Turner, 2015) and 
application assistance (Ye, 2018b)) that encourage students from disadvantaged schools to 
aim higher when applying for college.
36
References
Anders, J. (2012), ‘The Link between Household Income, University Applications and 
University Attendance’, Fiscal Studies, 33, 185–210.
Arcidiacono, P. (2004). Ability sorting and the returns to college major. Journal of 
Econometrics 121 (1), 343–375.
Black, S. E., Cortes, K. E., & Lincove, J. A. (2015). Academic undermatching of high-
achieving minority students: Evidence from race-neutral and holistic admissions policies. 
American Economic Review, 105, 604–610.
Black, S. E., Cortes, K. E., Lincove, J. A. (2018). Apply yourself: Racial and ethnic 
differences in college application. Education Finance and Policy. Advance online 
publication. doi:10.1162/edfp_a_00273
Boliver, V. 2013. “How Fair is Access to More Prestigious UK Universities?” The British 
Journal of Sociology 64 (2): 344–364. doi:10.1111/1468-4446.12021
Campbell, S., L. Macmillan, R. Murphy, G. Wyness (2019). Inequalities in student to course 
match: Evidence from linked administrative data. Discussion Paper, Centre for Economic 
Performance, LSE.
Chevalier, A. (2011). Subject choice and earnings of UK graduates. Economics of Education 
Review 30 (6), 1187–1201.
Chowdry, H., C. Crawford, L. Dearden, A. Goodman, and A. Vignoles (2013). Widening 
participation in higher education: analysis using linked administrative data. Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society) 176(2), 431–457.
Crawford, C., P. Gregg, L. Macmillan, A. Vignoles, and G. Wyness (2016). Higher 
Education, Career Opportunities, and Intergenerational Inequality. Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 32 (4): 553–575. 
Cullinan J. and J. Duggan (2016). A School-Level Gravity Model of Student Migration Flows 
to Higher Education Institutions. Spatial Economic Analysis, 11:3, 294-314.
Cullinan, J., Flannery, D., Walsh, S. and McCoy, S. (2013). Distance Effects, Social Class 
and the Decision to Participate in Higher Education in Ireland. The Economic and Social 
Review, Vol.44, Issue 1.
Delaney J.M. and P.J. Devereux (2019). Understanding Gender Differences in STEM: 
Evidence from College Applications. Economics of Education Review, Volume 72, October 
2019, Pages 219-238.
Denny, K. (2014). The effect of abolishing university tuition costs: Evidence from Ireland. 
Labour Economics, 26, 26-33.
Dillon, E. W., Smith, J. A. (2017). Determinants of the match between student ability and 
college quality. Journal of Labor Economics, 35, 45–66. 
37
Doris, Aedin, Donal O'Neill, and Olive Sweetman, 2019. Good Schools or Good Students? 
The Importance of Selectivity for School Rankings. Economics, Finance and Accounting 
Department Working Paper Series n293-19.pdf, Department of Economics, Finance and 
Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
Flannery D. and J. Cullinan (2014). Where they go, what they do and why it matters: the 
importance of geographic accessibility and social class for decisions relating to higher 
education institution type, degree level and field of study. Applied Economics, 46:24, 2952-
2965. 
Hoxby, Caroline M. and Christopher Avery (2013). The Missing ‘One-Offs’: The Hidden 
Supply of High-Achieving, Low Income Students. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 
Spring: 1-65.
Hoxby, Caroline M. and Sarah Turner. (2015). What high-achieving low-income students 
know about college. American Economic Review, 105(5):514–17.
Hussain, I., S. McNally, and S. Telhaj (2009). University quality and graduate wages in the 
UK. IZA Discussion Papers 4043.
Loyalka, Prashant, Yue Qu, Jianguo Wei, Binzhen Wu, and Xiaoyang Ye. (2017). Out of the 
gauntlet and into the fire: How college choices in centralized admissions systems 
disadvantage disadvantaged students. Working paper.
Oreopoulos, P. and Dunn, R. (2013). Information and College Access: Evidence from a 
Randomized Field Experiment. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 115: 3-26.
Smith, Jonathan, Matea Pender, and Jessica Howell. (2013). The full extent of student-
college academic undermatch. Economics of Education Review, 32: 247–261.
Svensson, Lars-Gunnar (1999). ‘Strategy-Proof Allocation of Indivisible Goods. Social 
Choice and Welfare, 16 (1999), 557–567.
Weber, S. and M. Peclat. (2017). A simple command to calculate travel distance and travel 
time. Stata Journal, Volume 17 Number 4.
Wyness, G. (2017). Rules of the game: Disadvantaged students and the university admissions 
process. London: Sutton Trust. 
Ye, Xiaoyang (2018a). Improving college choice for the poorest students: Results from 
randomized experiments in centralized admission. Working Paper.
Ye, Xiaoyang (2018b). Human instruction vs. machine learning: Experimental evidence on 
improving college access and match at scale. Working Paper.
38
Appendix: Extra Figures and Tables
Figure A1: Map of Ireland and Dublin showing location of Schools and Colleges
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Map of Dublin showing location of Schools and Colleges
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Match Quality on Enrollment Distribution by School Type
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Appendix Table A1: Mapping from Grades to Leaving Certificate Points
2015 and 2016
Grade Marks (%) Points Points (Math)
Higher Level
A1 90% to 100% 100 125
A2 85% to 89% 90 115
B1 80% to 84% 85 110
B2 75% to 79% 80 105
B3 70% to 74% 75 100
C1 65% to 69% 70 95
C2 60% to 64% 65 90
C3 55% to 59% 60 85
D1 50% to 54% 55 80
D2 45% to 49% 50 75
D3 40% to 44% 45 70
E 25% to 39% 0 0
F 10% to 24% 0 0
NG 0% to 9% 0 0
Lower Level
A1 90% to 100% 60 60
A2 85% to 89% 50 50
B1 80% to 84% 45 45
B2 75% to 79% 40 40
B3 70% to 74% 35 35
C1 65% to 69% 30 30
C2 60% to 64% 25 25
C3 55% to 59% 20 20
D1 50% to 54% 15 15
D2 45% to 49% 10 10
D3 40% to 44% 5 5
E 25% to 39% 0 0
F 10% to 24% 0 0
NG 0% to 9% 0 0
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2017
Grade Marks (%) Points Points (Math)
Higher Level
H1 90% to 100% 100 125
H2 80% to 89% 88 113
H3 70% to 79% 77 102
H4 60% to 69% 66 91
H5 50% to 59% 56 81
H6 40% to 49% 46 71
H7 30% to 39% 37 37
H8 0 to 29% 0 0
Lower Level
O1 90% to 100% 56 56
O2 80% to 89% 46 46
O3 70% to 79% 37 37
O4 60% to 69% 28 28
O5 50% to 59% 20 20
O6 40% to 49% 12 12
O7 30% to 39% 0 0
O8 0 to 29% 0 0
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Table A2:  Distribution of SES Measures using GUI Survey Data
Disadvantaged School Other School Advantaged School
Equivalized Household 
Income
€10000≤ 0.38 0.19 0.03
€10000 - €15000 0.27 0.26 0.11
€15000 - €20000 0.16 0.21 0.20
€20000 - €25000 0.07 0.13 0.15
€25000 - €30000 0.01 0.06 0.12
€30000 - €35000 0.01 0.02 0.09
€35000 - €40000 0.01 0.01 0.05
 €40000 ≥ 0.09 0.12 0.25
Occupational Class of Head 
of Household 
Professional 0.06 0.13 0.33
Managerial/Technical 0.25 0.37 0.45
Non-manual 0.21 0.20 0.10
Skilled Manual 0.13 0.09 0.02
Semi-Skilled/Unskilled 0.15 0.09 0.02
Unknown 0.20 0.11 0.09
Highest Education Level of 
Primary Caregiver
Primary School/ Lower 
Secondary
0.24 0.11 0.02
Higher Sec/Vocational 0.45 0.38 0.20
Non-Degree 0.13 0.21 0.19
Primary Degree 0.12 0.18 0.32
Postgraduate Degree 0.06 0.11 0.26
Note: This information uses the third wave of the Growing Up in Ireland (GUI) child cohort study which took 
place in 2017 when the child was aged 17 years old.
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 Table A3: Means of Selected Dependent Variables
Note: 16% of the sample come from disadvantaged schools, 9% come from advantaged schools, and 75% come 
from other schools. 








STEM -0.040** -0.121** 0.137 125,236
(0.006) (0.014)
Business, Administration and 
Law 
0.014* 0.110** 0.027 125,236
(0.006) (0.015)
Arts and Social Sciences 0.016** 0.096** 0.038 125,236
(0.006) (0.011)
Education 0.006* -0.051** 0.037 125,236
(0.003) (0.004)
Other 0.017* -0.018 0.084 125,236
(0.007) (0.010)
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses. ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. The omitted category is disadvantaged 
school. Controls include indicators for gender, age, and year, a quartic function of Leaving Certificate points (interacted with 
an indicator variable for 2017), and indicator variables for whether the student satisfies several subject- and grade-specific 












University First Preference 0.67 0.52 0.68 0.84 125236
Median Points First Preference 444 412 444 497 124749
Enroll in Top Choice 0.32 0.25 0.33 0.35 125236
List a 2nd Choice 0.95 0.91 0.95 0.98 125236
University listed for 2nd Choice 0.65 0.50 0.66 0.81 119088
Median Points on 2nd Choice 437 410 436 486 118349
List a 3rd Choice 0.89 0.82 0.90 0.97 125236
University listed for 3rd Choice 0.64 0.51 0.64 0.79 111716
Median Points on 3rd Choice 430 410 432 476 110855
Top 3 Choices University 0.49 0.34 0.50 0.70 115908
Top 3 Choices Average Median Points 438 409 438 488 113923
Top 3 Choices Same College 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.25 115908
Top 3 Choices Same University 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.22 115908
Top 3 Choices Same Non-University 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.04 115908
Top 3 Choices Same Field 0.44 0.43 0.44 0.43 115908
Top 3 Choices Similar Points 0.36 0.31 0.36 0.44 113923
Top 3 Choices Similar Points but not all 
Same Field
0.17 0.15 0.17 0.24 113923
List a Zero-Probability First Choice 0.23 0.31 0.21 0.17 106641
STEM First Choice 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.29 125236
Business Administration and Law First 
Choice
0.21 0.19 0.21 0.31 125236
Arts and Social Sciences First Choice 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.25 125236
Education First Choice 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.03 125236
Other field First Choice 0.20 0.23 0.21 0.11 125236
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Table A5: Characteristics of Preferences Listed as Top Choices
Estimates by Gender 




University first choice 0.022 0.056** 0.220 63,681
(0.011) (0.015)
Median Points first choice 2.710 22.018** 0.433 63,439
(1.707) (2.394)
Top 3 choices all same field -0.000 -0.051** 0.017 59,876
(0.009) (0.016)
Top 3 choices all similar points 0.023** 0.065** 0.017 58,829
(0.008) (0.015)
Top 3 choices all similar points 







University first choice 0.038** 0.088** 0.308 61,555
(0.011) (0.014)
Median Points first choice 3.686* 29.082** 0.490 61,310
(1.804) (2.563)
Top 3 choices all same field -0.018 -0.057** 0.014 56,032
(0.010) (0.016)
Top 3 choices all similar points 0.019* 0.078** 0.011 55,094
(0.008) (0.014)
Top 3 choices all similar points but 






Note: Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses. ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. The omitted category is disadvantaged 
school. Controls include indicators for age, and year, a quartic function of Leaving Certificate points (interacted with an 
indicator variable for 2017), and indicator variables for whether the student satisfies several subject- and grade-specific 
requirements for common programs and colleges.
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Table A6: Characteristics of Enrolled College Programs




Enroll in any program 0.018* 0.022 0.308 63,681
(0.008) (0.014)
University 0.015 0.026 0.353 45,445
(0.009) (0.016)
Median Points -0.614 6.847** 0.774 45,445
(1.082) (1.327)
Match Quality -0.002 0.023** 0.082 45,445
(0.004) (0.004)
Male
Enroll in any program 0.007 0.012 0.334 61,555
(0.008) (0.012)
University 0.023* 0.044** 0.453 43,304
(0.009) (0.016)
Median Points 0.993 12.692** 0.813 43,304
(0.858) (1.260)
Match Quality -0.000 0.039** 0.068 43,304
(0.003) (0.004)
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses. ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. The omitted category is disadvantaged 
school. Controls include indicators for gender, age, and year, a quartic function of Leaving Certificate points (interacted with 
an indicator variable for 2017), and indicator variables for whether the student satisfies several subject- and grade-specific 
requirements for common programs and colleges. Sample restricted to persons who accept a college place in rows 2 – 4.
